Modern Presidency and Separation of Powers
Separation of powers plays a key role in preventing abuse of power in American government. This paper evaluates the existing research on the subject of the powers of the U.S. executive branch in relation to the legislative and judicial branches. The opinions on whether presidency has grown too strong, or perhaps is not strong enough, vary, but researchers tend to agree that by putting enormous responsibility on one person only in the executive branch, the Constitutional framers made the presidency unique. This explains why concerns of abuse are more prevalent and understandable in the context of this branch than the others.
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